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Abstract 
 Service operations are pervasive and significant in today’s economy, with 
customers demanding both high levels of customization and consistency from 
service providers.  A major challenge in service operations is service recovery: 
converting a dissatisfied customer into a satisfied one.  In the case of airlines, 
some of the most important service recovery efforts occur after baggage has 
been delayed, lost or damaged.  Baggage recovery typically occurs at the end of 
a customer’s airline experience, making it one of the most memorable 
interactions that can impact return tendencies.  Despite the importance of this 
interaction, our study American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Southwest, 
Northwest, United, and US Airways over nine years and 18.5 million baggage 
transactions shows that Southwest Airlines dominates its competitors as a clear 
leader in positive service recovery efforts. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the procedures, policies, 
and cultural differences between Southwest Airlines and the remaining 
competitors.  Using service-profit chain theory, we show the importance of 
procedures, policies, and employee empowerment on service recovery efforts.  
In order to do this, we conduct fourteen interviews with associates and 
managers from multiple airlines.  Our analyses suggest that Southwest Airlines 
does a better job of communicating service recovery policies to customers.  
These results provide evidence of real differences between the service recovery 
processes of Southwest Airlines and the competition.  Furthermore, this 
corroborates previous work finding that Southwest consistently outperforms 
competitors in many service dimensions.  As airlines consolidate and expand, 
and as the customer base grows, providing high quality service to passengers will 
become increasingly difficult.  This research provides a look at one critical area 
where airlines can improve and make commerce easier. 
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1. Introduction 
 In today’s economy, daily interaction with a service industry competitor is 
nearly guaranteed.  As companies that sell primarily intangible goods, services 
are estimated to make up 77% of added value in the American economy 
according to the World Bank (WDI & GDF, 2010).  Due to the nature of services, 
some companies are constrained by characteristics such as inseparability of 
manufacture and delivery, immediate perishability, and intangibility, which 
distinguish services from manufacturing.  Service operations research, spawned 
in the late-1970’s, became keystone literature for students and practitioners 
interested in learning secrets to financial success through service delivery.  Over 
the years, service operations research evolved as a conglomeration of 
operations, marketing, and human resources, reflecting the importance of tight 
coordination among disciplines to achieve consistent customer satisfaction 
(Johnston, 1999). 
 A significant problem faced by practitioners is to deliver consistently 
satisfactory levels of service to customers.  The issue stems from the customer’s 
presence throughout service delivery, and requires constant adaptation on the 
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part of employees to micro customer demand and individual customer 
preferences.  Moreover, no customer receives exactly the same provided service 
due, at a minimum, to the natural variation of human interaction and emotion 
felt by front-line service employees.  This necessitates close interaction between 
operations, marketing, and human resources disciplines to ensure that 
employees not only understand the service concept, but that they are able to 
satisfactorily execute under varying conditions with a positive attitude. 
 Employees’ positive interaction with customers is tantamount to 
achieving service success.  Since services are intangible, there are no physical 
goods changing hands with which a customer can judge the company; 
employees serve as a main driver of satisfaction.  Additionally, services perish 
immediately upon consumption, such as seats on an airline flight that cannot be 
sold after the flight leaves, often leaving employees only a single interaction with 
which to create a positive image for the customer.  Without clear standards and 
employee empowerment to meet customer demands throughout a day, services 
can be a customer’s worst nightmare.  With them, it can be difficult for any 
competing offering to break the repeat customer’s loyalty. 
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 One way to retain customer loyalty after service failure is to execute an 
effective service recovery initiative.  This effort involves recognizing the 
customer’s problem, providing timely compensation or resolution, and assuring 
them that the cause of failure will be rectified (Sasser, Hart, & Heskett, 1991).  
Done properly, customer service recovery can return a customer’s satisfaction 
with the service, provide confidence in the company, and lead to loyalty, thereby 
avoiding negative word-of-mouth and a lost customer (Maxham, 2001). 
 Due to the critical influence of service recovery on brand image and 
profitability, this study will delve deeper into the service recovery framework to 
develop further understanding of its components.  Many service industries rely 
on service recovery, but if service recovery centers around customer critical 
items, it heightens the importance of the interaction.  Thus, this research will 
focus on airlines’ bag service recovery, because some of the most significant 
service interactions with an airline take place after a customer’s personal item 
has been delayed, lost or damaged.  Baggage recovery typically occurs at the end 
of a customer’s airline experience, making it one of the most memorable 
interactions that can impact return tendencies of customers. 
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 Airlines are a service sector many Americans are intimately familiar with.  
Last year, U.S. airlines carried 638 million passengers domestically, providing 
primary transport for most passengers travelling over 600 miles from origin to 
destination (Wensveen, 2007).  Despite large passenger numbers, airlines are 
plagued by exaggerated business cycles, persistently low returns of 3% industry 
wide which are well below their 8% cost of capital over the past decade (Pearce, 
2010).  One cause of these problems may be a lack of customer focus, a 
necessity highlighted by numerous service operations researchers (Dodds, 1999; 
Gronroos & Ravald, 1996; Hallowell, 1996; Heskett et al., 1994; Holt & Payne, 
N/A; Singgih & Purnasakti, 2010; Parasuraman, Berry, & Zeithaml, 1991). In 
addition to these generalized observations, Southwest Airlines provides an 
exalted example of service excellence, begetting profitability.  While recognized 
as the airline service leader by organizations like the American Customer 
Satisfaction Index, Consumer Reports, JD Power & Associates, and Fortune 
Magazine, Southwest is also the only airline in this study to report a profit every 
year between 2002 and 2010 (American Airlines 2002-2010, Continental Airlines 
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2002-2010, Delta Airlines 2002-2010, Northwest 2002-2007, Southwest Airlines 
2002-2010, United Airlines 2002-2010, US Airways 2002-2010). 
 One major factor in Southwest’s profitability may be an effective service 
recovery program.  To measure the frequency with which airlines must initiate 
baggage service recovery efforts, we aggregated mishandled baggage data per 
1,000 customers from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics monthly “Air 
Consumer Travel Reports” for years 2002 - 2010.  Figure 1 shows self-reported 
mishandled baggage incidents for each airline studied.  Data is collected per 
Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Federal Aviation Regulation 234.6, and 
cover nearly every delayed bag incident, as well as all damaged, lost and 
extended delays. 
Figure 1 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Summary
American 4.26 4.42 4.73 5.88 6.36 7.26 5.68 4.30 3.82 5.19
United 3.73 3.92 3.95 4.27 5.72 5.81 5.23 4.09 3.42 4.46
Delta 3.58 3.83 5.36 7.00 6.92 7.59 6.00 4.90 3.53 5.41
Continental 3.12 3.10 3.55 4.10 4.71 5.29 3.91 2.71 2.65 3.68
US Air 2.95 3.54 5.34 9.55 7.85 8.41 4.76 3.04 2.58 5.33
Southwest 3.52 3.35 3.35 4.24 5.36 5.90 4.58 3.43 3.47 4.13
Northwest 4.46 3.40 4.24 4.88 4.62 5.02 3.49 2.59 4.09
Yearly Averages
Mishandled Bag Reports
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 Conducting an ANOVA analysis, the variation between Southwest and its 
competitors is not statistically significant at the .01 level with a p-value of .02 
and with Continental, the farthest outlier removed from the data, the variation 
between Southwest and its competitors becomes insignificant at the .1 level 
with a p-value of .12.  From 2002 to 2010, Southwest had the lowest mishandled 
baggage rate only once and over the entire period had the 3rd lowest mishandled 
baggage rate.  This indicates that Southwest must deal with a similar percentage 
of customers with bag complaints as its competitors. 
Assuming a standard level of service recovery across the industry for 
mishandled bags, we expect to see comparable customer satisfaction resulting 
from the baggage service recovery process.  Using mishandled bag complaints 
per 100 million customers from the “Air Consumer Travel Report” as a measure 
of customer satisfaction, however, reveals a dramatically different story.  
Southwest is more successful at keeping customers from self-reporting 
dissatisfaction with mishandled bags, by a factor of 10, better than any 
competitor in any year covered in this study (Figure 2).  In some months 
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Southwest could even boast 100% satisfaction with their baggage service 
recovery process. 
Figure 2 
 
Southwest’s success in mitigating mishandled bag complaints suggests that 
their service recovery process exhibits tangible differences from the customer 
point of view.  The goal of this research is to identify the significant factors in 
Southwest’s service recovery effort that mitigates their customer reported 
service failures more successfully than its competitors.  Inquiry into Southwest’s 
service recovery methods as a benchmark against competitors should yield 
insights into how companies can structure successful recovery efforts. 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Summary P-value
1.27E-27
American 2.6 1.82 2.27 3.08 3.74 5.07 3.9 3.33 3.95 3.31
United 2.95 1.79 1.91 3.04 3.16 4.8 4.14 3.02 3.82 3.18
Delta 1.88 1.46 2 3.4 2.93 5.56 4.89 4.81 4.11 3.45
Continental 2.03 1.78 1.7 2.28 2.15 2.95 2.16 1.94 2.64 2.18
US Air 1.57 2.1 2.05 8.01 3.59 4.83 2.63 2.2 2.07 3.23
Southwest 0.465 0.29 0.283 0.241 0.565 0.614 0.456 0.404 0.443 0.43
Northwest 2.2 1.59 1.41 2.24 1.68 3.17 1.95 2.97 2.15
Yearly Averages
Mishandled Bag Complaints
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2. Literature Review 
 Service operations research began with the identification of the 
significant differences between manufacturing and services, which have 
intangibility, inseparability of production and consumption, heterogeneity, and 
perishability (Johnston, 1999; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).  Research 
during this period was generally conceptual in nature, concerned with 
developing frameworks for structured analysis and development of services 
(Johnston, 1999).  For example, researchers exploring customer contact time 
(Chase, 1981), customization (Maister and Lovelock, 1982), and amount of value 
added in the front and back office helped establish the widely recognized 
categorizations of services as either mass, professional, or shop (Johnston, 
1999).  As the field matured, integration of operations and service concepts 
including marketing and human resources became accepted practice as a field all 
its own, to be tested empirically.  Bitner (1990) used the critical incident method, 
developed for traditional operations analysis, to test the impact of varying 
service encounters on customer satisfaction.  Parasuarman, Zeithaml, and Berry 
(1988) took factors supposedly expected by customers categorized as: tangibles, 
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reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy, and measured their 
importance across four service industries.  They found all to be important with 
reliability as the most significant and tangibility as the least.  During this period, 
there was also growing recognition that service operations could contribute to 
improving traditional manufacturing operations research (Johnston, 1999).  The 
final stage of service operations research, the one informing this paper, is a 
prescriptive one (Johnston, 1999).  The discipline has enough empirically tested 
framework foundations to understand relationships between operations drivers 
such as quality, staff satisfaction, and internal quality on profits and customer 
satisfaction.  One such work, return on quality, by Rust et al. (1995, 1999) linked 
investment in quality to measurable returns based on the assumptions that 
quality must remain financially accountable, it is possible to spend too much on 
quality, and not all quality expenditures are equally valid investments. 
 Service recovery, as a subcategory of service operations research, 
harbors a framework all its own.  To start, there are multiple foci of recovery 
such as customer recovery, employee recovery and process recovery (Johnston 
& Michel, 2008).  Process recovery involves data collection and analysis of critical 
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incidents followed by costing and improvement to rectify process deficiencies 
(Johnston & Michel, 2008).  Employee recovery is concerned with “supporting 
employees in their difficult role”, whereas customer recovery, the focus of this 
research, stresses the importance of returning a dissatisfied customer to 
satisfaction (Johnston & Michel, 2008).  Johnston & Michel (2008) tried to assess 
the performance benefits of the three recovery modes, using established 
frameworks such as the seven activities that appear to resolve complaints: 
acknowledgement, empathy, apology, owning the problem, fixing the problem, 
providing assurance, and providing compensation.  Other service recovery work 
focuses on issues specific to the task of returning unsatisfied customers to 
satisfaction.  Such research includes looking at how full, partial, and unresolved 
resolutions effect customer return tendencies (Leong et al., 2002), measuring 
the effect of these critical incidents (Edvardsson, 1992), and companies’ demand 
coping mechanisms (Armistead & Clark, 1994). 
Many service recovery researchers, such as Rio-Lanza et. al., view the 
customer recovery process as intimately tied with theories of justice.  This 
analysis splits the process into three parts: distributive, procedural, and 
11 
 
interactional justice.  Distributive justice is the customer’s perception of what 
they receive compared with what they deserve, procedural justice refers to 
whether customers believe the decision-making criteria were fair, and 
interactional justice captures the acceptability of interpersonal relations (Tax & 
Brown, 1998; Gustafsson, 2009).  These variations combine with the general 
conclusion that companies should try to provide a recovery level “relative to 
what the customer has invested in the relationship” (Gustafsson, 2009). 
Another body of work, the service-profit chain (SPC), originated by 
Heskett et al. (1997) modeled links between employee satisfaction and loyalty, 
customer satisfaction and loyalty, and profitability.  This concept has significant 
implications for service recovery.  SPC work showing that independent 
employees endowed with capability and the freedom to work productively 
provide better service to customers, hints at the possibility that independent 
front-line employees provide quicker, more accurate, and cheaper service 
recovery, as tested by Boshoff (1996).  Further connection arises from the 
proposition that loyal customers, measured appropriately under industry specific 
circumstances, directly positively affects profitability.  There is wide recognition 
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that service recovery has an important impact on loyalty and also an implicit 
understanding that an unrecovered customer carries hidden costs, such as 
negative word-of-mouth and purchasing from competitors (Dewitt & Brady, 
2003; Mattila, 2001; Maxham, 2001; Swanson & Kelley, 2001).  Given the deep 
connections between SPC and service recovery work, argued for by Tax and 
Brown (1998), this research will highlight the SPC effects in furthering or 
hindering service recovery efforts. 
 A final consideration in service recovery is the environment within which 
the recovery takes place.  Findings from Spangenberg et al.’s (1996) work on 
olfactory cues to Wakefield and Blodgett’s (1996) look at college football 
environments suggest that anything from the space, lighting, layout, smell, 
parking, and color scheme can affect customer satisfaction.  Thus, a critical 
component of assessing the relative merits of service recovery efforts must look 
at the physical space in which these interactions take place. 
 Service recovery, service-profit chain, and environment studies should 
inform airline baggage service recovery to be financially responsible while 
identifying with the customers’ problems and resolving them quickly and 
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efficiently.  While there is no body of work looking at service recovery applied 
specifically to mishandled baggage to draw from, specific guidance can be found 
from other research.  For example, by assigning a specific office the task of 
recovering mishandled bags, airlines reduce the amount of uncertainty 
personnel and procedures must cover, thereby limiting costs.  This could allow 
airlines, despite dealing with idiosyncratic situations, to limit customization of 
resolutions to a few common situations such as limited delays, over-night delays, 
and extended delays by people trained to handle such issues.  Additionally, 
airlines should ensure that employees are trained to empathize with potentially 
upset customers, and able to recover their emotions to a more positive state 
before addressing the next person with an issue.  From a customer perspective, 
the recovery process is much better if the designated office is well lit, with 
helpful and preferably positive signs, communicating that this is something that 
the airline cares about, invests in, and sincerely wants to rectify.  Finally, 
managers should use critical mishandled baggage incidents to assess the 
effectiveness of employees and processes to keep future failures from occurring 
and continuing to recover customers successfully in the future. 
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3. Research Methodology 
 Since service recovery has been established as critical to customer 
retention, process improvement, employee retention, and profitability, when 
the service concept fails, one might expect companies within a service sector to 
compete to parity in recovery efforts, disallowing any firm to gain a competitive 
advantage.  However, we find a different story when examining airline data on 
mishandled baggage rates and customer satisfaction with mishandled baggage.  
Compared with competitors, Southwest Airlines does a decent yet not 
extraordinary job of carrying bags without mishaps, but manages to return 
customers, by an order of magnitude, to satisfaction more often than other 
airlines. 
 Unbundling and analyzing the airline baggage recovery process was a 
multi-step process.  First, we undertook a review of airline website material to 
understand the basic process.  This information provided a general baseline to 
gauge company conformance with their own stated policies, conformance of 
service recovery standards across the industry, and ease of access to relevant 
policies for customers.  After this, further information was gathered utilizing in-
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depth, in-person interviews to gain first-hand knowledge of the recovery 
process.  Interviews were granted at three airlines: Southwest, United, and 
American across all levels of the companies.  Initial interviews were conducted 
using a set of thirteen questions, tailored to understand training, management 
support, and policies as they are put into practice.  After at least two interviews 
with each company, the questions were revised to a set of nineteen questions in 
order to resolve unanswered questions or expand on others.  Six interviews were 
conducted with Southwest employees, consisting of station managers, two front-
line bag office employees, and one baggage manager at corporate headquarters.  
Additionally, interviews with station managers and front line employees for 
American and United were conducted for a total of fifteen interviews.  After 
interviews were conducted, reviews of baggage service offices at Port Columbus 
and San Francisco International Airports were undertaken to assess the service 
recovery environment provided by each airline.  Finally, publicly available 
documents for the airlines were assessed to glean information about employee 
empowerment and compensation.  With all the information compiled, an 
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extensive review was undertaken to find what, if any, tangible differences might 
exist from a customer perspective between Southwest and its competition. 
4. Results 
To initiate the inquiry into airline baggage service recovery, we reviewed the 
airlines’ websites to gauge ease of use for customers as well as understand what 
baseline policies could be expected within each company and across the 
industry.  The structure of all the companies’ websites are very similar, with 
Southwest, United, American, and US Air’s websites only taking 2-clicks to get to 
delayed, lost, or damaged policies while Delta’s website takes 3-clicks.  The 
format of United, American, and US Air’s websites is extremely similar, utilizing a 
drop-down bar at the top of the page, while Southwest and Delta both use the 
same alternative format of a link at the bottom of the page.  Southwest and 
American’s webpages stand out as well designed and visually pleasing, while 
United’s webpage is basic, simply providing the links a customer might need.  
Additionally, all the airlines provide information in simple language, allowing 
almost any passenger to understand the terms and conditions of their liability 
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and policies.  Finally, all the companies prominently provide at least phone 
contact information within their lost, delayed, and damaged bag pages. 
Another important aspect of an airline’s website is to set customer 
expectations about what will be covered and done by the airline to resolve an 
issue.  Thus, we use the websites to get a baseline of what procedures and 
policies are used across the industry.  For delayed bags, every airlines specifies 
that passengers should report the missing bags within four hours at the airport 
baggage service office, and should give the office five days to locate the bag.  If 
five days pass, then it is the customer’s responsibility to file a claim form with 
the airline’s central baggage office.  Currently, all the airlines except for 
Southwest provide the ability to track your bag to see when it will arrive.  Also, 
Delta and US Air specifically mention reimbursable expenses for up to 5 days and 
$50 per day, while American merely mentions that they are available and how to 
claim them, and United and Southwest do not say anything on the subject.  For 
damaged bags, every company specifically denies responsibility for various every 
day wear and tear, including damage to handles, wheels, zippers, and minor cuts 
and scratches.  Also, they eschew responsibility if a customers’ bag is deemed 
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overstuffed, packed unsuitably, or for fragile items.  All companies refer 
customers to their central baggage office for damage complaints and place 
responsibility on the customer to file a claim form.  The companies seem to have 
almost, if not exactly, the same policies outlined on their websites.  Thus, no 
company would prime customers to expect anything exceptional or out of the 
ordinary from their baggage recovery processes. 
The service recovery process begins in the baggage service office, with the 
first face-to-face interaction a customer has after a bag does not appear on time 
or arrives damaged.  This initial stage of recovery is critical to eliminating 
customer disconfirmation through tactical use of timely and adequate 
repayment by an employee with proper rank to meet the situations’ demands 
(Boshoff, 1996).  For Southwest, American, and United, this process begins with 
a front-line employee trained to work in the baggage office, at the ticket 
counter, and at the boarding gate fielding the customers’ issue.  Additionally, all 
three airlines draw posts similarly, using an employee bid system in which all 
those working a given shift rank their station preferences with the most senior 
members getting first assignment.  There is no systematic testing of knowledge 
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or interpersonal skills by any airline, although all station managers indicated that 
they can and do use discretion when placing employees to posts.  Multiple 
Southwest employees stated that one lady who has been with the company 
since 1995 works the office Monday through Friday, suggesting that it is a 
coveted position.  However, a front-line United employee indicated that 
although he had senior rank and did not want to work in the baggage office, he 
was placed there over a junior employee because they did not have the requisite 
knowledge.  That example highlights one of the pitfalls of posting cross-trained 
employees at such a critical front-line post.  Although the employee on-duty had 
the proper knowledge to service customers, he may not be fully engaged with 
the job because he prefers another position or believes he been slighted by a co-
worker’s shortcomings. 
 On the other hand, by cross-training employees and rotating their 
position assignments, management at all three airlines seem to be doing 
equivalent jobs trying to break the monotony of being stuck at certain duties.  
Many of the front-line staff noted in the interviews that they had recently 
worked at other positions, and that each job demanded different skills.  For 
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instance, several staff members noted that the ticket counter requires them to 
be constantly engaged with co-workers and customers handling mostly routine 
tasks as opposed to the baggage service office which is much more secluded, 
interrupted periodically by bursts of activity that require problem-solving skills to 
resolve each customer’s unique situation. 
 An area that did exhibit important differences was in the availability of 
management support to baggage service personnel.  Southwest at Port 
Columbus International is run by a station manager with a ten person span of 
control.  At least one member of that team is available on-site when an 
employee is on-duty at the baggage service office except on Saturday nights 
when two employees are assigned to the office instead.  American Airlines at 
Port Columbus International is run by a station manager with a three person 
team, and personnel indicated that at smaller stations there may not always be a 
supervisor available on-site.  Finally, United Airlines has four customer service 
managers on site but does not always have supervisors available in Columbus 
when employees are on-duty at the baggage service office.  The lack of 
management support at all times for American and United present a situation 
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ripe for the occurrence of critical incidents.  Management is least likely to be 
available late at night, when customers are most likely to be desperate to get 
their situation resolved quickly.  Also, many delayed bags arrive on the next 
flight, which could mean forcing customers to wait until the next day for an 
otherwise routine procedure. 
 Another important consideration for the effectiveness of service recovery 
is the full package of employee compensation (Heskett, 1994).  Pay, ancillary 
benefits, and leadership provided by the companies as well as intangible perks 
stated by front-line employees during interviews provide motivation for staff to 
give high levels of service.  Employees from all three companies mentioned 
travel perks and flexibility of schedule as nice bonuses, while United Airlines 
employees also mentioned the opportunity to create relationships with 
customers and co-workers.  Multiple Southwest employees expressed 
satisfaction with pay relative to those at competitors.  Although differences in 
pay do not seem to be substantial, hourly American employees begin at $11 per 
hour and can advance to $24 per hour whereas Southwest staff begin at $11.61 
per hour and can expect to make $26.61 per hour after 12 years of employment, 
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workers interact across organizations and have an awareness of relative 
compensation which confers prestige to and fosters pride in those with higher 
wages.  Another key insight derives from the companies 2010 annual reports.  At 
first glance, Southwest appears to place a much greater emphasis on culture and 
rewards for employees.  Quantified as the number of times the reports mention 
‘employees’ reveals the true extent of the difference between Southwest, 
American, and United.  Southwest references employees 100 times in 120 pages 
for a rate of .83 per page.  In comparison, American only writes about employees 
40 times in 118 pages or .34 per page and United only 89 times in 224 pages or 
.4 per page.  These numbers suggest a fundamental difference in attitudes at 
Southwest, American, and United with respect to focusing on employee 
satisfaction and loyalty. 
 Closely tied to the compensation of employees is their training.  With 
proper guidance, employees can take their initiative and translate it into 
competent action toward satisfying customers (Heskett, 1994).  Southwest, 
American, and United all appear to have similar training regimens.  New hires are 
sent to headquarters for two weeks of training on company procedures and 
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systems.  Staff at every company indicated that there is little emphasis on 
customer service, although transmission of a strong employee-centric culture 
during this initial training period could translate into high levels of service 
(Hesket, 1994).   Extrapolating from the annual report comparisons, Southwest 
probably outperforms its competition in this regard.  Remaining training is seen 
by front-line staff as on-the-job training, although station managers indicated 
that more was done.  For example, Southwest and United managers stated that 
shadowing occurred for up to two weeks after initial training while American’s 
station manager explained that they have 3 day training available upon request 
for current employees on new company systems.  All three companies conduct 
online courses on topics such as hazardous materials, disabled passengers, and 
airport security.  These programs are required for all staff on a yearly or other 
time-sequenced basis.  Training across the companies does not seem to differ 
significantly. 
 Proper training coupled with a strong employee and customer culture 
should translate into beneficial communication with complainants.  One of the 
first and most important things to do when fielding a complaint is to apologize 
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for the problem (Bell & Zemke, 1987; Johnston & Michel, 2008).  The only 
employee who mentioned apologizing to customers was a Southwest front-line 
staff member who made clear that she always consciously apologizes when 
people come into the baggage service office.  Another critical aspect of 
communication during service recovery is making the customer feel as though 
their issue is important to the company and will be fixed in a timely manner 
(Johnston & Michel, 2008).  Again, it appears that Southwest staff has a more 
empathetic stance toward the customer.  Every airlines’ employees stated that 
they do not have typed policies or instructions available for customers to take 
home at the baggage service office.  American and United staff stated that they 
usually refer people to their website if they need to see policies.  In comparison, 
a Southwest staff-member said, “We try not to refer customers to the website, 
but to help them here”.  This attitude, that a customer should be helped in 
person and not from a website, provides significant contrast between Southwest 
and competitors.  It may make the customer feel more valued during their 
dissatisfactory experience. 
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 Another aspect of ensuring that customers feel their complaint is valued 
by the company is to resolve the issue quickly.  Settling the problem within a 
reasonable amount of time is one of the key drivers of customer satisfaction 
with the recovery process (Boshoff, 1996).  For airline passengers, many of 
whom are in town only for a limited time, this time horizon may be shorter than 
for other services.  As mentioned earlier, late flights can force passengers to wait 
until the next day to receive their delayed bags; pushing severe mishandling 
issues, such as pilferage, damage, and lost and found, up the chain-of-command 
or to headquarters can delay resolution by days or weeks.  American, Southwest 
and United appear to give similar amounts of autonomy to their front-line staff 
in terms of identifying coverable complaints and awarding restitution.  Likewise, 
the companies exhibit parity in those issues that they send passengers to 
headquarters for resolution about, such as getting reimbursed for expenses 
during bag delays, which are handled on a case-by-case basis. 
 One counter-intuitive point arises in the inspection of the 
appropriateness of restitution given by airlines to customers.  Although it is easy 
to surmise that a higher level of atonement would yield higher customer 
26 
 
satisfaction and would be the route followed by Southwest to achieve such 
dramatic results, this is not the case generally or in this case.  In services 
generally, it has been found that while higher levels of atonement do correlate 
with more satisfied customers, it does not appear that atonement is necessary if 
other aspects of service recovery are executed well (Boshoff, 1996).  Not 
surprisingly then, Southwest’s delivery schedules, bag repair contracts, bag 
replacement policies, and liability limits are all the same or equivalently similar 
to its competition. 
Finally, customers’ attitudes are affected by the physical service recovery 
environment (Spangenberg et al., 1996; Wakefield & Blodgett, 1996).  Most 
baggage services offices at any given airport are similar in layout, lighting, and 
basic amenities since the offices are leased by the airlines from the airport.  
However, strategic leasing can affect customer perceptions.  For example, 
Southwest and United’s baggage offices were easy to find and adjacent to their 
assigned carousels, while American’s office was wedged between United’s office 
and a construction company office, making it invisible from its assigned 
carousels.  Also, the Southwest office was the only one at Port Columbus 
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International with branding beyond a name and logo combination on the back 
wall.  Their light-hearted poster on the wall behind the desk espoused the 
company’s ethos of hard work while driving humor into a potentially tenuous 
environment.  Otherwise, all three companies posted liability signs with items 
that they do not cover, and had similar decorations and branding on the 
entrance, desk, and walls. 
Not only does the office environment affect customer perception, but by 
designing the office to facilitate work and make it more enjoyable for employees, 
a company can raise employees’ performance.  Each office at Port Columbus 
International had equivalent layouts, seating, back-office space, and computer 
terminals.  The most prominent difference is that Southwest has a digital arrival 
board in their baggage service office, which simplifies employees’ 
communication with customers about when the next arrival from a customer’s 
point-of-origin is expected, to predict when their bag should arrive.  However, 
American and United track all bags in their system whereas Southwest does not, 
which would allow their associates to give guaranteed assurance that a 
customer’s bag will arrive on the next flight or pin-point its position in the 
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transportation system.  Timely access to critical information is a clear potential 
advantage for employees at American and United. 
5. Conclusion 
 By benchmarking American and United’s service recovery against 
Southwest’s, several things become clear about factors affecting successful 
recovery.  The ‘soft’ interpersonal skills espoused by Heskett et al. (1994) 
generated by creating an employee-empowering company culture are 
paramount to resolving service failures.  It allows staff to respond quickly and 
empathetically to customer needs, while also encouraging employees who want 
to work in an environment where they must think critically to solve idiosyncratic 
situations.  Paradoxically, the level of atonement nor the title of respondent 
serve as differentiators in the airline service recovery context. 
 Even though there are not significant differences between Southwest and 
its competitors in any of the traditional service recovery paradigms of level of 
atonement, title of respondent nor timeliness of recovery, their ability to 
motivate employees seems to serve as an even more viable long-term 
competitive advantage in service recovery.  As mentioned, levels of atonement, 
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time to repayment and title of respondent can be replicated by competitors to 
parity, but the small day-to-day actions of motivated employees cannot be easily 
copied.  Thus, Southwest’s ability to keep customers relatively satisfied with 
baggage service recovery efforts stems not from the processes themselves but 
from how employees utilize those avenues to shape customer experience. 
This research has some limitations.  First, it draws from a limited sample 
base.  More interviews across the management structure of all three airlines as 
well as inspections of other baggage service offices could provide greater insight 
into variations within each airline to inform a more holistic perspective on the 
differences across airlines.  We were also unable to do analysis of the over-the-
phone aspect of the bag recovery process of an actual mishandled bag, which 
could provide further insights into the differences between Southwest and its 
competitors.  Finally, the study lacks actual input from customers. 
 These limitations presage some potential research projects.  Extending 
this study to include a larger population of airlines and members of those 
organizations should serve to reinforce the conclusions above.  Also, empirical 
validation of the observations can solidify the conclusion that the service-profit 
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chain has a significant impact on service recovery efforts in airlines.  Finally, 
because the customer satisfaction data is probably generated from highly 
dissatisfied customers, those upset enough to self-report on the Department of 
Transportation website, a more focused study of differences between recovery 
efforts of airlines during severe service failures may yield interesting insight. 
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